SNOWSHAGALKorea's Exports Are Less AI-Concentrated Than Taiwan's—but More Sensitive to Memory PricesNO.36
SNOWSHAGALINVESTMENT INSIGHTNO.36
EXPORT MANIFESTNo. 036
SHIPPERKOREA · TAIWAN
CARGOCHIPS · ELECTRONICS
PERIOD2026.10
AHEAD OF NVIDIA EARNINGSOFFICIAL DATA

Korea's Exports
Are Less AI-Heavy.
Yet Memory Prices
Still Drive the Risk.

U.S. 21.6%KOREAKOREA 54 / 100U.S. 34%TAIWANTAIWAN 83 / 100KOREA MIXMemory 44Other chips 5PC/SSD 5TAIWAN MIXICT 49Components 34Other
100 cells = October exports. Taiwan uses broader categories. Matched HS codes (Hanwha): 45% vs. 72%
82%Share of Oct. export growth:
chips + computers
70%Share of Oct. export growth:
memory alone
2/3Share of electronics growth:
price effect (Oct., est.)
INVESTMENT INSIGHT · AI EXPOSURESNOWSHAGAL.COM
INVESTMENT INSIGHT NO.36 · NOV 16, 2026

On comparable product codes, Taiwan's exports are more concentrated in AI-linked goods. Taiwan depends more on server shipments to U.S. data centers; Korea is more sensitive to memory-chip prices.

THREE QUESTIONS
  1. Q1How exposed is Korea if NVIDIA stumbles?01~03
  2. Q2Why did KOSPI fall harder if Taiwan's exports are more AI-heavy?04
  3. Q3What exports can cushion Korea outside AI?05
1.7:8.0IT contribution to H1 GDP growth
(percentage points, KR:TW)
34.5%Servers and GPU hardware
as % of Taiwan exports (Korea: <0.1%)
+51%Oct. electronics export volume
Growth was not all price

Sources: Korea's Industry Ministry, Korea Customs Service, Taiwan's Ministry of Finance, BOK, Hanwha Securities, iM Securities and others

Published Nov 16, 2026 · Data through Nov 16 PM KST · Stocks at Nov 16 close · ~11 min read

SUMMARYFIVE KEY POINTS
  1. Official figures confirm that chips and computers drove export growth. They accounted for 82% of October's increase; semiconductors alone generated 72% of growth in the first ten days of November.
  2. Taiwan is more concentrated on comparable product codes. Hanwha Securities used the same HS codes to measure AI-linked products: 45% of exports for Korea versus 72% for Taiwan. Taiwan also ships a greater share directly to the U.S. Neither measure isolates final AI demand.
  3. Korea is especially sensitive to memory prices. Memory supplied 70% of October's export increase. Prices drove roughly two-thirds of electronics export growth, though volume also rose 51%.
  4. Yet Korean stocks fell furthest in H2. From June 30 to Nov 16, KOSPI lost 39.8% versus 11.0% for Taiwan's TAIEX. After doubling in H1, KOSPI remains 21% above year-end 2025. Samsung Electronics and SK hynix together make up nearly half the index—more concentrated than exports.
  5. Watch NVIDIA for server demand and HBM procurement. Verify memory prices separately through suppliers and contract data. Cosmetics, biopharma and food exports are growing, but their combined October value was only 7% of chip exports.

Hover over dotted terms (tap on mobile) for definitions. Red dotted terms are central to the analysis.

NVIDIA reports Q3 earnings at 7 a.m. Wednesday, Nov 18, Korea time—its first since the Nov 12 U.S. announcement of the CEO's resignation and the CFO's appointment as interim CEO.1, 2

The question: if NVIDIA weakens, how much does Korea suffer? Semiconductors made up 49% of Korea's $115.28 billion in October exports.3 Hanwha Securities estimates that AI-linked products accounted for roughly 80% of Korea's export growth this year.4

Yet Taiwan is even more concentrated on like-for-like product codes. The bigger difference is what each economy sells: Taiwan ships servers; Korea ships memory.

BAY01RECHECK THE NUMBERS

Chips and computers drove
82% of export growth

AI-linked products drove growth, consistent with Hanwha's analysis. But these figures use different periods and categories, so they are not an exact replication.

Hanwha defines AI-linked goods as memory and other chips plus AI-server computing equipment and components (six-digit HS codes). The closest industry-ministry categories are semiconductors and computers.4 H1 exports rose 48.3%, with memory contributing 25.7 percentage points and AI infrastructure equipment 13.6 points (growth contribution). Together they made up about 80% of the gain. Here is the comparison with official ministry and customs data.

SourceScope · PeriodShare of IncreaseShare of Total Exports
Hanwha SecuritiesAI-linked productsH1 2026About 80%Memory 53% · AI infrastructure 28%45%2026
Industry MinistryChips + computers (incl. SSDs)October82%Semiconductors alone: 73%54.0%28.0% a year earlier
Customs ServiceSemiconductorsNov 1–1072%49.7%

Sources: Hanwha Securities, Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources, Korea Customs Service, The Korea Herald3, 4, 5, 6 · Ministry and Customs contributions calculated by reconstructing last year's values from published growth rates

These are product-concentration measures, not direct AI end-demand estimates. Chips also include memory for smartphones and PCs.

Anatomy of the export gains

FIG.1October's export gains:
Korea was driven by memory
Year-over-year increase (US$100m) · Korea's Industry Ministry; Taiwan's Finance Ministry
KOREAIncrease: US$55.8bnMemory393Other chips 15Computers 49Other102TAIWANIncrease: US$35.9bnICT / servers201Components124Other 34
Memory Other chips Computers (SSDs) ICT goods (incl. servers) Electronic components Other

Sources: Korea's Industry Ministry; Focus Taiwan (Taiwan Finance Ministry)3, 7

BAY02KOREA VS. TAIWAN

Korea is less concentrated
than Taiwan

Across five measures, Taiwan (black squares) ranks higher than Korea (orange circles). Each measure uses its own denominator.

FIG.2On all five measures,
Korea runs at 50–80% of Taiwan's level
Percent · Compare within rows, not across them · October categories differ by country
0%25%50%75%100%AI-linked export share2026 · Hanwha's HS basket4572AI-linked export shareOctober · different product baskets5483Exports shipped to U.S.October · All exports21.634AI exports shipped to U.S.2026 · Hanwha Securities17.734.9IT share of GDP growthH1 · Hanwha estimate46.256.4
Korea Taiwan

Sources: Hanwha Securities, Korea's Industry Ministry, Focus Taiwan (Taiwan Finance Ministry)3, 4, 7

Taiwan's October ICT-plus-components category includes phones and telecom equipment, making it broader than Korea's chips-plus-computers basket. The first row, using matched HS codes, is the better comparison.

Contribution to economic growth

Routes to the U.S.

Same AI demand, different routes

MeasureKoreaTaiwan
Main productsMemory-led semiconductor exportsServers, ICT goods and electronic components
Direct destinationsMostly China, Hong Kong and other Asian marketsLarger direct share to the U.S.
Key metricsMemory prices, volumes and contractsServer shipments, orders and assembly volumes
Exposure to final AI demandNot directly measured hereNot directly measured here

Taiwan's server export value includes imported chips and memory. So “less exposed” here refers to export mix and routes—not a direct measure of ultimate AI demand.

BAY03PRICE VS. VOLUME

Korea's exposure lies
in memory prices

Prices account for more of the semiconductor export gain under every approach. That does not mean volumes were flat.

Export value equals price times volume. We separate the two effects three ways.

PRICE VS. VOLUMEWEIGHBRIDGE TICKET No.036-03
1 · SEMICONDUCTORS · JAN–SEP · CUSTOMS WEIGHT (HANWHA)
Export value+184.4%
Unit value per kg+178.4%p
Weight contribution+6.0%p
2 · SEMICONDUCTORS · JAN–SEP · BOK INDICES (YUANTA)
Unit price +148.3% · Volume +16.2%
Price accounts for 86% of growth
3 · ELECTRONICS INCL. CHIPS · OCTOBER · BOK
Value +214.8% · Volume +51.2%
Price: roughly two-thirds; volume: roughly one-third
4 · What about total October export volume?
Customs-cleared weight (Hanwha)−3.1%
BOK volume index+43.9%
Volume rose too

Sources: Hanwha Securities (1, 4), Yuanta Securities (2), Bank of Korea and MTN (3, 4)4, 14, 15, 16 · For (3), the price effect is estimated from value and volume growth factors. Depending on the allocation method, prices account for 50–76%. See Methods.

Why the measures differ

Why price dependence matters

Memory prices swing more sharply than volumes. Rising prices amplify export growth; falling prices can reverse it just as quickly.

That is why NVIDIA news affects the two countries differently: Taiwan asks, “How many servers will ship?”; Korea asks, “Will memory prices hold?”.

For the memory-cycle debate, see Insights No.29 (Earnings Credibility) and No.34 (Memory Fab Timelines).

BAY04WHY KOSPI FELL FURTHER

Yet Korean stocks fell
the furthest in H2

Korea's AI-linked export share is lower than Taiwan's, but its stock market has fallen most among the three since midyear.

FIG.3Indexed to 100 at year-end 2025,
KOSPI doubled—then gave back much of the gain
Closing levels · Last trading day of 2025; Jun 30 and Nov 16, 2026
1001502002025.122026.6.3011.16H2201159139TAIEX −11.0%KOSPI −39.8%NIKKEI −14.8%Since June 30
KOSPI Taiwan TAIEX Nikkei 225

Sources: Korea Economic Daily, Kyodo News, Commercial Times, Yahoo Finance (closes), iM Securities18, 19, 20, 21, 22

Start with the full year. KOSPI gained 101% in H1, far more than TAIEX (+59%) or Nikkei (+39%). It then lost nearly 40%, but remains 21% above year-end 2025. TAIEX is up 42% YTD and Nikkei 19%. Taiwan leads on full-year returns; Korea has seen the biggest swings.

All three markets sold off on AI shocks. In the week after the U.S. midterms (Nov 2–6), as concern over data-center restrictions grew, TAIEX fell 12.2%, KOSPI 11.7% and Nikkei 9.3%.4 On Nov 16, amid AI caution and U.S. inflation worries, all three fell again: TAIEX 6.0%, KOSPI 3.6% and Nikkei 2.4%.21, 23 The wider divergence since June therefore needs more than an AI-shock explanation.

Why exports and stocks diverge

Four possible drivers of the gap

CandidateEvidenceFurther context
1 · H1 rallyA bigger rally left more room for a pullback (iM Securities).22FIG.3
2 · Foreign sellingNet foreign outflows were far larger in Korea than in Taiwan; Japan saw net inflows this year (iM Securities).22NO.32
3 · Won appreciationSince June 30, yen/won fell 12% and Taiwan dollar/won fell 17%.21 iM Securities says those currency moves coincided with changes in KOSPI's relative performance. It argues currencies may affect AI-sector profits more than price competitiveness.22 Converting KOSPI into Taiwan dollars reduces its decline to about 28%, narrowing the gap with TAIEX from roughly 29 to 17 percentage points.NO.16
4 · Memory-price doubtsWhen export growth depends on prices, earnings expectations can overshoot on the way up and retreat sharply near a suspected peak. KOSPI's H1–H2 pattern is consistent with this—but does not prove causation.NO.29 · NO.34

We cannot apportion the gap among these four factors. Even iM Securities says the link between won appreciation and KOSPI weakness remains hard to explain.22

BAY05BEYOND AI EXPORTS

Three non-AI growth engines—
still small beside chips

When chip risks rise, what else can support exports?

Cosmetics, instant noodles and pharmaceuticals have grown across markets outside the U.S., with both prices and volumes rising.

ProductExport growthContribution from non-U.S. marketsUnit value · Weight contribution
Cosmetics+31%+23.1%pU.S.: +8.0pp+8.2%p · +22.8%p
Instant noodles+24.9%+19.8%pU.S.: ~+5.1pp+3.4%p · +21.5%p
Pharmaceuticals+15.7%+21.5%pU.S.: ~−5.8pp+5.6%p · +10.1%p

Jan–Sep · Hanwha Securities analysis of Korea Customs data4 · U.S. contributions for noodles and pharmaceuticals are approximated as total growth minus non-U.S. contribution

FIG.4Together, the three October categories
equal just 7% of chip exports
October export value (US$100m) · Korea's Industry Ministry
Semiconductors
564.4
Cosmetics · Biopharma · Agri-food & fisheries14.4 + 15.3 + 11.1
40.8

Source: Korea's Industry Ministry3

These categories cannot offset a major semiconductor slowdown alone. Total non-chip exports reached US$58.84bn in October, more than chip exports, but include large, differently driven sectors such as cars and petroleum products.3 Hanwha sees consumer goods and biotech as alternatives if concerns about AI spending intensify.4 For country-level cosmetics trends, see Insight No.23.

BAY06WATCH THIS WEEK

NVIDIA earnings this week:
what Korea should watch

Insight No.21 tracks the AI earnings scoreboard. Here we follow how NVIDIA's numbers transmit to each country.

Transmission to Taiwan
  • Data-center revenue and next-quarter guidance
  • Server-rack and GPU-board shipment plans → Taiwanese ODM exports
  • U.S. customers' capex plans
Transmission to Korea
  • HBM Comments on HBM procurement (volume and contract tenor)
  • Whether rising memory costs appear in margin commentary
  • Any changes in sourcing or orders after the leadership transition

NVIDIA earnings offer an indirect read on memory demand—not proof of memory selling prices. Check suppliers' results and contract-price data. If NVIDIA does not disclose procurement prices, its call alone cannot establish a trend.

Next data points

  1. 11.18 06:20 · 07:00
    NVIDIA Q3 results and earnings callKorea time · Release ~1:20 p.m. U.S. Pacific Nov 17; call at 2 p.m.
  2. 11.19 04:00
    October FOMC minutesKorea time
  3. Around Nov 21
    Korea Customs: Nov 1–20 exportsWill the chip share shift from 49.7% in the first ten days? Is memory still below October's pace?
  4. 11.26
    Bank of Korea rate decisionPolicy rate decision
  5. 12.1
    Korea's November trade releaseWatch export value and daily averages, not just YoY growth
  6. Early December
    Taiwan's November exportsFinance Ministry forecast: US$94.2bn–96.7bn (+47–51%)
  7. Mid-December
    BOK November trade indicesCompare electronics volume and value indices. Can volume offset weaker prices?

Sources: NVIDIA, Federal Reserve Board, Business Watch, Focus Taiwan, Eugene Investment & Securities1, 7, 8, 30, 31

BAY07RISKS & CATALYSTS

What could change the conclusion?

1If memory prices hold

October's DRAM contract price (DDR4 8Gb) hit another record at US$27.50. NAND stopped rising after 21 months.32 As long as prices hold, price sensitivity supports exports rather than undermining them.

2If non-chip exports provide a cushion

October exports excluding chips rose 34.3% YoY, but daily-average growth slowed from 37% in September to 22% in October.8 Faster non-chip growth would dilute the semiconductor share. Hanwha's chip-plus-SSD share already edged down from 55.4% in September to 53.8% in October.14

3If won appreciation stops

Stable exchange rates would weaken explanation (3) in Section 04. Hanwha notes USD/KRW is down 8.7% YoY and that since 2008, declines have often halted near 10%.33 History is no guarantee; the question is whether appreciation continues or stops.

KNOWNEstablished facts
  • Most October export growth came from chips and computers, chiefly memory
  • Taiwan's U.S.-bound export share reached a 36-year high in Jan–Oct
  • Both prices and volumes drove October electronics export growth
ESTIMATEBrokerage and institutional estimates
  • AI-linked export share and U.S.-bound share (Hanwha HS definition)
  • IT share of H1 growth: Korea 46%, Taiwan 56%; Korea Q3 ~60% (BOK commentary)
  • Reasons for the equity divergence (iM Securities)
UNKNOWNStill unknown
  • When memory prices will turn
  • Which end-use AI markets Korea's memory reaches through intermediaries
  • How NVIDIA's management transition affects sourcing and orders
CONCLUSIONCONCLUSION

Korea depends on memory prices.
Watch prices first; confirm with volume.

Korea's exports are less concentrated in AI-linked goods than Taiwan's, but the exposure is narrower. Watch three things, in order.

  1. Memory prices and volumes. Monitor DRAM contract prices, ten-day customs data on chip unit values and volumes, and the BOK's volume and value indices. If prices fall without volume support, Korean exports may weaken first. Stocks react to whether future prices and shipments beat expectations—not just today's levels.
  2. Direction of concentration. Does chips-plus-computers rise above October's 54.0% share or fall? Is daily-average growth in non-chip exports accelerating again?
  3. Why the equity gap persists. Watch won appreciation against the yen and Taiwan dollar, along with foreign selling. If both ease but KOSPI still lags, doubts about future memory prices deserve more weight.

This is not a recommendation to buy or sell. Reference dates and calculations follow.

RELATED READINGNO.07 · Record Exports, Depressed ValuationsNO.16 · The Won Looks Strong—Not Yet on a Real Effective BasisNO.32 · Who Sold the ₩214 Trillion?NO.34 · Memory Fabs Start Up in 2027; Capacity Arrives in 2028Korean original
Glossary
AI-linked products (Hanwha definition)
Memory (HS 854232), other chips (854231, 854239), and AI computing equipment/components (852351, 847150, 847330, 847180). Roughly comparable to Korea's semiconductor-plus-computer categories, including SSDs.
Growth contribution (pp) vs. contribution share (%)
Growth contribution is the percentage-point addition of a category to overall growth. Contribution share is that addition divided by total growth.
Industry's share of GDP growth
A sector's proportion of total GDP growth. Korea and Taiwan use IT manufacturing value added; Hanwha's U.S. AI figure uses investment adjusted for equipment trade. They are not directly comparable.
Unit value vs. weight
Customs export value divided by kilograms gives value per kg. Moving to higher-end products raises this figure even if like-for-like prices do not change.
Volume index vs. value index
BOK trade indices. Volume index = value index ÷ export price index. It estimates real shipments after stripping out price effects.
Exports per working day
Monthly export value divided by working days. October 2026 had two more working days than October 2025.
HBM and contract prices
High-bandwidth memory stacks DRAM dies beside AI chips. Contract prices are negotiated between memory suppliers and major customers.
ODM
A contract manufacturer that designs and builds products for customers. Taiwanese server assemblers are examples.
Calculation notes
  • Memory share: Oct 2025 108.9 ÷ 595.1 = 18.3% → Oct 2026 501.4 ÷ 1,152.8 = 43.5%; share of growth 392.5 ÷ 557.7 = 70.4%. Amounts in US$100m.
  • October increase (Industry Ministry): 1,152.8 ÷ 1.937 = 595.1 → +557.7 (US$100m units); chips 564.4 ÷ 3.594 = 157.0 → +407.4 (73.0%); computers 9.8 → 58.5, +48.7; chips + computers +456.1 (81.8%); memory 108.9 → 501.4, +392.5 (70.4%); memory as % of chips 501.4 ÷ 564.4 = 88.8%.
  • October export shares: chips 49.0%; chips + computers 54.0% (year-earlier: (157.0 + 9.8) ÷ 595.1 = 28.0%); U.S. 249.0 ÷ 1,152.8 = 21.6%; China 23.4%.
  • Nov 1–10 (Customs): 335 ÷ 2.119 = 158.1 → +176.9; chips 166 ÷ 4.312 = 38.5 → +127.5 (72.1%). Amounts in US$100m.
  • Taiwan October (Finance Ministry): 967.6 ÷ 1.589 = 608.9 → +358.7; ICT 476.0 ÷ 1.729 = 275.3 → +200.7; components 326.8 ÷ 1.614 = 202.5 → +124.3; combined +325.0 (90.6%); share (476.0 + 326.8) ÷ 967.6 = 83.0%; U.S. 329.3 ÷ 967.6 = 34.0%. US$100m units.
  • Price–volume attribution: value factor = volume factor × price factor, so log-based price share = 1 − ln(volume factor) ÷ ln(value factor). October electronics: 1 − ln(1.512) ÷ ln(3.148) = 64%; September (volume +46.6%, value +212.4%) gives 66%. Alternative allocation: holding volume at its prior-year level gives 108.2 ÷ 214.8 = 50% from price; assigning the 55.4pp interaction term to price yields 76%. Yuanta's Jan–Sep chip estimate of 86% follows the log method (price +148.3%, volume +16.2%). Hanwha's weight-based estimate: 178.4 ÷ 184.4 = 97%.
  • GDP growth: Korea 1.7 ÷ 3.8 = 44.7% (Hanwha reports 46.2%); Taiwan 8.0 ÷ 14.1 = 56.7% (reported 56.4%).
  • Stock closes: KOSPI Dec 30, 2025 4,214.17 → Jun 30 8,476.48 (+101.1%) → Nov 16 5,100.50 (−39.8% from June); Nikkei 50,339.48 → 70,062.32 (+39.2%) → 59,662.02 (−14.8%); TAIEX Dec 31, 2025 28,963.60 → 46,125.91 (+59.3%) → 41,040.08 (−11.0%). Fig.3 rebases year-end 2025 to 100 (Nov 16: KOSPI 121.0; TAIEX 141.7; Nikkei 118.5). Full-year returns: +21.0%, +41.7%, +18.5%. Nov 16 alone: TAIEX 43,675.12 → 41,040.08 (−6.0%); KOSPI 5,290.53 → 5,100.50 (−3.6%); Nikkei 61,142.35 → 59,662.02 (−2.4%).
  • Midterm week (Oct 30–Nov 6 closes): KOSPI 5,730.74 → 5,059.69 (−11.7%); TAIEX 45,211.83 → 39,701.64 (−12.2%); Nikkei 63,290.11 → 57,434.77 (−9.3%). Matches Hanwha's figures.
  • FX (Jun 30–Nov 16 afternoon): KRW per ¥100 952.2 → 834.0 (−12.4%); KRW per TWD 48.62 → 40.49 (−16.7%); KRW per USD 1,548.6 → 1,335.6 (−13.8%).
  • Common-currency comparison: KOSPI in TWD, (5,100.50 ÷ 40.49) ÷ (8,476.48 ÷ 48.62) − 1 = −27.7%, versus TAIEX −11.0%; gap 16.7pp instead of 28.8pp in local currencies. In JPY, KOSPI −31.3% versus Nikkei −14.8%; gap 16.5pp. Excludes dividends and transaction costs.
  • Scale: cosmetics 14.4 + biopharma 15.3 + agri-food & fisheries 11.1 = 40.8 (US$100m), versus chips 564.4 = 7.2%. Total October exports ex chips = 1,152.8 − 564.4 = 588.4 (US$100m).
  • Approximate U.S. contribution (Jan–Sep): noodles 24.9 − 19.8 = +5.1pp; pharma 15.7 − 21.5 = −5.8pp; cosmetics 31.0 − 23.1 = 7.9pp (Hanwha reports +8.0pp after rounding).
Differences across sources
'80%'Hanwha's text says “about 80%,” while a chart headline says “83%.” H1 memory and AI-infrastructure contribution shares sum to 81.4%; the chart appears to include other chips. We retain the text's wording.
AI-linked shareHanwha: 45% (2026, HS basket); October chips + computers: 54.0% (Industry Ministry); Hanwha's October chips + SSD: 53.8%. Different periods and categories are labelled separately in Fig.2.
Taiwan's shareHanwha's 72% (2026 HS basket) vs. October ICT + components 83% (Taiwan Finance Ministry). The latter is broader.
IT contribution to growthHanwha: 46.2% vs. 1.7 ÷ 3.8 = 44.7% (apparently rounding); Taiwan's IT value added was unavailable after 2025, so Hanwha estimated it using production indices. BOK's “about 60%” for Korea in Q3 is an official's commentary, not a published data table.
Price vs. volumeHanwha's weight-based method differs from Yuanta/BOK indices. Categories (chips vs. computers, electronics and optics) and periods (Jan–Sep vs. October) differ too. October total export weight: −3.1% by Customs/Hanwha (apparently tonnage), versus +43.9% on the BOK volume index.
Chip export growthIndustry Ministry: +259.4%; Hanwha: +259.5%. Eugene's chip share: 48.9% vs. calculated 49.0% (rounding).
Ten-day memory figuresHana's US$1.60bn is an average per working day for Nov 1–10, not the monthly total.
U.S. export shareHanwha's U.S.-bound share of AI goods: 17.7% (2026) vs. 21.6% of all October exports. Different product baskets.
Stock comparison periodsiM Securities used Nov 13 closes: KOSPI −37.6%, Nikkei −12.7%, TAIEX −5.3%, which we replicated. This report updates to Nov 16 closes. Hanwha's midterm-week figures (Nov 2–6) cover a different window and are excluded from the chart.
Definition of AI-linked productsAn export classification, not end-demand. Chips include memory for phones and PCs; Taiwan's ICT class includes non-server telecom and video equipment. Taiwan Finance Ministry calls the groups “Information, Communication and Audio-Video Products” and “Parts of Electronic Products.”
Hanwha's underlying figuresHanwha's report provides HS-code data behind Korea's 45% and Taiwan's 72%, the Jan–Sep chip price/weight split, Taiwan's server/GPU and U.S. shares, and regional contributions for three non-AI categories. We quote these figures but could not independently reconstruct them from primary datasets.
Index weightsSamsung Electronics and SK hynix: 35.22% of KOSPI at year-start; 55.67% at Jun 22 close (Etoday); over 46% on Nov 6 morning (SBS Biz). TSMC: 41.478% of TAIEX as of Aug 31 (StockFeel). Not same-date observations.
Earnings scheduleNVIDIA releases results around 1:20 p.m. U.S. Pacific on Nov 17 and starts its call at 2 p.m. (Korea: ~6:20 a.m. and 7 a.m. Nov 18).
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  26. StockFeel 股感, 「權值股是什麼?權值股有哪些?權值股漲一元大盤漲幾元?」, 2026.09.18. stockfeel.com.tw
  27. Kyobo Securities, “2027 Cosmetics Outlook: The Boom Is Real—Strongest Fundamentals, Lowest Valuations,” Nov 16, 2026.
  28. DS Investment & Securities, “Industry Outlook 2027: Food, Entertainment and Media—Through the Tunnel,” Nov 16, 2026.
  29. Eugene Investment & Securities, “Equity Strategy” (Global Strategy), Nov 16, 2026.
  30. Federal Reserve Board, “November 2026” (calendar), 2026. federalreserve.gov
  31. Business Watch, “BOK Weighs Another Rate Hike as KOSPI Selloff Adds Uncertainty,” Nov 8, 2026. bizwatch.co.kr
  32. SBS Biz, “NAND's 21-Month Rise Ends; DRAM Hits Another Record,” Oct 30, 2026. biz.sbs.co.kr
  33. Hanwha Securities, “MP: Golden Time” (Quant Strategy), Nov 16, 2026.

Data through Nov 16, 2026 PM KST · Equity prices at Nov 16 close