SNOWSHAGAL RESEARCHSPECIAL RESEARCH NO.102026.10.14snowshagal.com

Diesel, Not
Crude

The fuel-price bottleneck before the midterms

In September, New York Harbor diesel spot prices were up 107% from a year earlier—roughly twice the 52% rise in crude. Crude prices alone no longer tell the fuel-cost story. We examine how the measures announced before the November 3 U.S. midterm elections could work, and what the numbers mean for inflation and Korean industries.

Data cutoff: Oct. 14, 2026, 10:00 p.m. KST · Includes September U.S. CPI release

FUEL · U.S. AVG10.05 WEEK

DIESELDiesel · $3.711 a year earlier

REGULARRegular gasoline · $3.124 a year earlier

USD per gallon · EIA weekly U.S. retail average (including taxes) · Diesel–gasoline gap: $1.845, versus $0.587 a year ago

THE BRIEF

To understand fuel costs, look beyond crude to refined products

Diesel has risen far more than crudeA barrel of New York Harbor diesel cost $107.8 more than a year ago. Of that increase, $74.4—69%—came from a wider price spread over WTI (Snowshagal calculation). This is an arithmetic decomposition of two prices, not a measure of refiners' actual profits or a causal breakdown.
Constraints on refined-product supply and tradeDisruptions around Hormuz and the Red Sea, strikes on Russian refineries and China's export controls have coincided. U.S. refineries entered their seasonal maintenance period, while distillate inventories were about 12% below their five-year average in the week ended September 18 (as cited by the EPA).
Each policy operates through a different channelThe G7 agreed to draw on stockpiles and coordinate refinery operations; Russia partially eased its export ban, initially allowing 500,000 tonnes; and the U.S. directed relief on red-dyed diesel restrictions and a deferral of tax payments. On October 2, President Trump said the U.S. would not impose a diesel export ban. The test of these measures is actual shipments, inventories and product prices.
The counterargument—and what remains unresolvedRetail diesel is 5.1% below its September 21 weekly peak, and the decline began before the policy announcements. Daishin Securities expects diesel crack spreads to narrow in the fourth quarter. But the European diesel premium widened between the October 2 and October 9 weekly closes (Snowshagal calculation), and Russian contracts and shipments remain unverified.
Gasoline drives the CPI; export prices drive Korea's figuresIn July, CPI categories that include diesel carried a combined 0.22% weight (0.24% in August), far below gasoline's 3.77% (3.85% in August). September CPI rose 3.7% year on year, above the 3.6% consensus, capturing price pressure that preceded the October measures. In Korea, September petroleum-product export volumes fell 6.9% while unit prices rose 84.7%.

U.S. dates use local U.S. time; CPI and FOMC release times are also shown in Korea time. Brokerage forecasts are analysts' estimates, not company guidance.

Illustration of a U.S. highway at sunset with fuel-price signs showing diesel $6.19 and nine-tenths of a cent, regular gasoline $4.35 and nine-tenths, and a truck driving toward the horizon — Illustration · Pump prices use U.S. nine-tenths-of-a-cent notation, based on EIA nationwide averages for the week of Oct. 5: diesel $6.199 and gasoline $4.354.

01 · PRICES

Why Diesel Outran Crude

Fuel prices across the U.S. have risen this year, but not at the same pace. While crude climbed by roughly half, wholesale diesel doubled. The divergence opened up in the spread between the refined product and its underlying crude benchmark.

SAME MONTHSame month, very different price gains

Using September monthly averages for both years makes the disparity clear. WTI spot crude rose 52.1% year on year; New York Harbor ultra-low-sulfur diesel (ULSD) spot prices climbed 107.4%.^{1, 2} At the pump, diesel rose 67.8% and regular gasoline 37.6%.^{3, 4} Retail prices rose less because the per-gallon total includes taxes and distribution costs that do not move proportionately with the wholesale fuel price.

The direction is consistent across sources. Eugene Investment & Securities, citing AAA, puts the year-on-year rise in U.S. diesel at 71%, compared with 56% for crude.⁵ Europe saw an even steeper increase: at the October 9 close, ARA diesel futures were up 117.1% from a year earlier, versus 60.6% for Brent crude.⁶

In September, wholesale diesel rose about twice as fast as crude

September 2026 monthly average versus September 2025 · dieselin red, crudein amber, gasolinein teal

SOURCE EIA monthly spot averages (WTI and New York Harbor ULSD); EIA weekly pump prices · Retail figures are simple averages of September weekly readings · Graphic: Snowshagal

ONE BARRELBreaking down the price of a barrel of diesel

The price of diesel can be expressed as the crude benchmark plus the spread between the two. A barrel of New York Harbor diesel rose from an average of $100.4 in September 2025 to $208.2 in September 2026, a $107.8 increase. WTI accounts for $33.4 of the difference; the remaining $74.4 reflects a wider spread over WTI(Snowshagal calculation).

Of the $108 increase, $74 came from the wider spread over WTI

New York Harbor diesel per barrel = crude (WTI) + spread over WTI (crack) · September 2025 vs. September 2026 monthly averages

CALCULATION New York Harbor ULSD spot ($/gal) × 42 − WTI spot ($/bbl) · EIA monthly averages · Snowshagal calculation · An arithmetic decomposition of the price difference, not causal attribution or a refiner's realized margin

Snowshagal calculation · Spread decompositionShare of the diesel price increase attributable arithmetically to a wider spread over WTI$74.4 of $107.8 · WTI accounts for $33.4 (31%) · September monthly averages · Not refiner earnings or an estimate of individual drivers

This is an identity: diesel price = WTI + the price spread. We can establish that the spread widened; we cannot infer that the entire widening came from refinery shortages or accrued as profit to refiners. The comparison also pairs a New York Harbor product price with WTI at Cushing, so transportation disruptions and regional supply-demand conditions matter. EIA uses crack spreads as an indicator of short-term refining profitability, but notes that they exclude other variable and fixed costs.⁷ Treat the figure as evidence consistent with a tighter refined-product market—potentially reflecting constraints on refining capacity, trade and logistics.

The monthly crack spread reached $110.8/bbl in September, above October 2022's $94.9 and the highest since 2021 on our EIA-based series. Daily prices, however, have reacted to policy news. The front-month NYMEX ULSD crack spread fell $6.45 intraday to $96.80 on October 9, as news of additional Russian diesel supplies emerged (S&P Global; 19:33 GMT).⁸ That daily futures measure is not directly comparable with the monthly spot series.

The diesel crack spread exceeded its 2022 peak

Monthly crack spread (New York Harbor diesel spot minus WTI spot), January 2021–September 2026

SOURCE EIA monthly spot averages · Snowshagal calculation · Figures may differ from the NYMEX front-month futures crack spread because the underlying series differ

THE PUMPTwo numbers on the fuel-price sign

Gasoline is the number motorists and voters see every day. Diesel powers the trucks, farm equipment and heating systems behind the economy. EIA's weekly U.S. diesel average passed its June 2022 record of $5.810/gal in the week of September 7 ($5.967), peaked at $6.529 in the week of September 21, and eased to $6.199 by the week of October 5.^{3, 9} Regular gasoline averaged $4.354 that same week. The $1.845 gap is more than three times its year-earlier level of $0.587.

The gasoline–diesel gap has more than tripled in a year

EIA weekly U.S. retail averages, January 2025–week of October 5, 2026 · dieseland gasoline · Tap the chart to view weekly figures

SOURCE EIA Gasoline and Diesel Fuel Update (weekly, Monday reference date) · Graphic: Snowshagal

02 · SUPPLY

Refineries and Trade Routes Under Strain

Nighttime refinery illustration with a fractionating tower labeled LPG, naphtha, jet fuel, diesel and residue; the diesel section is highlighted red, with a flare burning to the right — Distillation-column schematic · Crude separates by boiling point into LPG, naphtha (gasoline feedstock), kerosene/jet fuel, diesel and residue, from top to bottom · Segment heights are illustrative, not actual product yields

The widening spread suggests that refined-product supply is tighter than the underlying crude market. This year, diesel-making capacity and the routes used to move it have come under pressure at the same time. Ready-to-use diesel reserves are finite, and crude must pass through a refinery before it can become diesel.

MIDDLE DISTILLATESThe middle of the barrel

Fractional distillation yields diesel, heating oil and jet fuel/kerosene among the middle cuts—known collectively as middle distillates. That is why a diesel shortage can put pressure on jet fuel and heating oil as well. In Asian spot markets on October 9, kerosene (in the same distillate family as jet fuel) traded at $174.9/bbl, above gasoil's $162.5 (Petronet data).⁵

THREE ROUTESThree supply routes under pressure

MIDDLE EAST

Hormuz and the Red Sea

110,000b/d

Barrels per day of Middle East diesel exports to Europe through September 21, down from 191,000 b/d in August and the lowest since February 2020.¹⁰ Before the war, about 900,000 b/d of diesel—roughly 10% of global diesel trade—passed through Hormuz (Hana Securities).¹¹

RUSSIA

Refineries hit by drones

140,000b/d

Barrels per day of Russian diesel shipments in Q3, down 500,000 b/d year on year. Nearly half of refining capacity was offline by late September (S&P Global CERA). Diesel exports had been banned since July, with the ban extended to end-October.⁸ On October 10, Russia partially eased the ban, initially allowing 500,000 tonnes of overseas supply.¹²

CHINA

Export permits, issued month by month

3.7mtonnes · Three fuels combined

China's approved October exports of diesel, gasoline and jet fuel combined (re-authorized October 9). This is not a diesel-only figure. Analysts estimate jet fuel will account for about 60% of October exports, with gasoil at roughly 900,000 tonnes (S&P Global).^{13, 14} Hana Securities describes the amount as 20% below August, apparently comparing approved October volumes with August customs exports of 4.58m tonnes—a potentially inconsistent basis. China is approving shipments monthly rather than through an annual quota. Hana also notes that commercial diesel inventories are 20m barrels below pre-war levels, which could constrain November exports.¹¹

MAINTENANCE SEASONU.S. refineries enter maintenance season

U.S. refiners are the obvious candidates to help fill the shortfall, but spare operating capacity is limited. Refinery utilization reached 98% in late August, the highest since 2018 (Hana Securities, Sept. 7), before falling toward 92% as autumn maintenance began.^{11, 15} Utilization can recover as maintenance ends. The question is how quickly—and whether G7 efforts to coordinate maintenance actually add production. U.S. distillate inventories totaled 105.14m barrels in the week ended October 2. A September 18 figure cited by the EPA in its October 5 Texas fuel waiver was about 12% below the five-year average; the agency's letter judged recovery unlikely before early 2027.¹⁶ East Coast stocks (PADD 1) were 32% below the 2021–25 September seasonal average, and EIA expects them to remain 20–30% below normal through winter.¹⁷

Maintenance begins, utilization falls—but exports continueWeekly U.S. distillate balance · EIA weekly estimates
Week ended	Refinery utilization	Distillate stocks	Product supplied	Distillate exports
08.28	98.0%	10,419	339	174
09.04	97.8%	10,627	368	156
09.11	96.8%	10,786	350	161
09.18	94.0%	10,743	398	133
09.25	92.5%	10,518	395	153
10.02	92.7%	10,514	365	176

Inventories in 10,000 barrels; product supplied and exports in 10,000 b/d · Distillates include diesel and heating oil · EIA treats product supplied as a proxy for demand · Weekly estimates can differ from finalized monthly data · Next release: Oct. 15 (holiday delay)

Over the past six weeks, the U.S. exported 1.33m–1.76m b/d of distillates. The four-week average of 1.56m b/d was equivalent to about 40% of domestic distillate product supplied (Snowshagal calculation). Reports in late September said export restrictions were under consideration, but¹⁸ on October 2, following the G7 agreement, President Trump said the U.S. would not impose an export ban.¹⁹ As long as exports continue, U.S. buyers compete with Europe and Latin America for the same supply.

OBSERVED · EIA / EPAU.S. distillate inventories versus the five-year averageWeek ended Sept. 18 (stocks: 107.43m barrels) · Cited in EPA's Oct. 5 letter · East Coast (PADD 1) stocks were 32% below September's seasonal average (EIA)

SEASONAL CONTEXTA seasonal pattern, not a forecast

Hana Securities, using Petronet data, finds that average diesel refining margins over 2011–25 (region unspecified) bottom around week 34 in late August and rise through week 46 in mid-November. Seasonal refinery maintenance, harvest demand and winter heating-oil stockbuilding are offered as explanations.¹¹ The average excludes the crisis years 2022–23 and is not a U.S. benchmark. With war, sanctions and physical refinery damage at play this year, it is context—not a timetable to trade on.

Four illustrated cards: RU shows a tanker, G7 shows oil drums, EO shows a red 24.4-cent diesel can, and BAN shows a locked valve — Four policy cards · RU: Russian diesel export/import authorization · G7: reserve releases and refinery coordination · EO: red-dyed diesel executive order · BAN: proposed diesel export restrictions · Illustration

03 · POLICY

Four Policy Moves Before the Vote

Over two weeks from late September, Washington, the G7 and Russia put forward four sets of measures. New refinery output, barrels drawn from stocks, supply diverted between destinations, and changes to fuel-use rules or tax payments work in different ways—and call for different tests of success. We judge them not by the barrels announced but by whether shipments, inventories and like-for-like product prices actually change.

Five channels through which policy can affect fuel pricesSome measures can move prices without adding production · Channel definitions and monitoring indicators: Snowshagal
Channel	What changes	Policy measure	What to check
New production	Actual output of refined products	G7 coordination of refinery maintenance and temporary utilization increases; DOE Strategic Petroleum Reserve crude exchange (to keep crude inputs flowing)	Refinery utilization; distillate production
Reserve releases	Additional stockpiled barrels reaching the market	G7/IEA release of up to 100m barrels of oil and products, prioritizing diesel	Actual releases by member countries; European diesel premium
Trade diversion	Supply available in particular regions	Partial easing of Russian export ban; OFAC GL135; U.S. export ban (on hold)	Russian contracts, shipments and arrivals; U.S. distillate exports
Looser fuel-use and distribution rules	Broader permissible uses of existing fuel stocks	Relaxed road-use penalties for dyed diesel; EPA Texas sulfur-specification waiver	Regional retail prices and inventories
Taxes and cash flow	Amount due now and timing of payment	Deferral of the 24.4-cent-per-gallon federal diesel excise tax, subject to Treasury determinations and implementing guidance	Tax-inclusive retail prices

These are proposed channels, not proof of an impact · European stock releases could reduce the pull on U.S. exports without reaching U.S. ports · Conversely, a U.S. export ban would not redirect every restricted barrel into the domestic market

RUOCT. 09: GL135 · OCT. 10: RUSSIA

Permission to trade Russian diesel

What changes: The U.S. authorized the sale, transport and import of Russian diesel through April 7, 2027, under OFAC General License 135²⁰ · Russia partially lifted its own diesel export ban on October 10, initially permitting 500,000 tonnes of overseas supply¹²
Volume: Deputy Prime Minister Novak's plan: 300,000 tonnes in October, 500,000 in November, 1m in December, and potentially up to 3m tonnes per month thereafter¹² · The same broad figures as President Trump's October 9 announcement⁸ · On October 12, Novak projected monthly exports could recover to 3m–3.5m tonnes, roughly pre-crisis levels, by year-end²¹
Before Nov. 3: Only the October tranche has much chance of reaching the market before the vote. Permits, plans, contracts, loadings and arrivals are different figures; the share destined for the U.S. is unknown
Limitations: Russian refining capacity has been damaged. If the measures merely redirect existing exports, net additions to world supply may be limited (Eugene Investment & Securities)⁵
Legal / political: The G7's October 2 statement explicitly maintained sanctions on Russia,²²while Washington granted a Russian-diesel exemption on October 9. On October 11, seven senators—four Republicans and three Democrats, including Senate Foreign Relations ranking member Jeanne Shaheen—called for its withdrawal, arguing it conflicted with the 2022 ban on Russian energy imports²³. On October 13, 12 senators, including Richard Blumenthal (six Republicans, six Democrats), wrote to the president seeking to rescind the agreement and OFAC GL135. Five signed both appeals, leaving 14 distinct senators²⁴. Representative Brian Fitzpatrick (R) had said on October 10 that he would propose import-blocking legislation and seek a procedure to force a vote²⁵. Legal and policy uncertainty hangs over contracts, shipments and customs clearance for U.S.-bound cargoes

CHANNEL · Trade diversion

G7OCT. 02 · LEADERS' STATEMENT

Up to 100m barrels from reserves, plus refinery coordination

What changes: A G7/IEA release over four months of up to 100m barrels of crude and refined products, with a “substantial” quantity of diesel in the first 20 days. Members would coordinate maintenance to avoid simultaneous refinery shutdowns, temporarily raise utilization where possible and cooperate with major refining nations. The G7 also agreed to avoid energy export restrictions among members²²
Volume: The crude/diesel mix was not disclosed. JPMorgan and a European diplomat said much of the volume may be unfulfilled commitments from March's IEA release^{26, 27} · Even previously pledged stocks are new market supply if they have not yet been released
Before Nov. 3: The initial 20-day diesel priority window runs to around October 22. The releases would largely serve Europe, but could reduce European demand for U.S. products
Limitations: Drawing down stocks today can create replenishment demand later, potentially sustaining refining margins (Hana Securities)¹¹ · The extra production achieved through refinery coordination is not yet quantified

CHANNEL · Reserve releases + refinery operations

EOSIGNED OCT. 05 · EXECUTIVE ORDER

Dyed-diesel restrictions and tax-payment relief

What changes: Executive Order 14435 directed measures to defer federal diesel excise-tax payments and relax penalties for using tax-exempt, red-dyed off-road diesel on public roads from October 5 through December 31. Eligibility, scope and feasibility depend on Treasury determinations under the law and subsequent IRS guidance^{28, 29} · Separately, an EPA Texas waiver allowed use of diesel containing up to 500 ppm sulfur through October 24, subject to restrictions including engine compatibility¹⁶
Volume: No new fuel is produced. The measures expand which existing fuels can be used within the refining and distribution system
Before Nov. 3: The federal 24.4-cent levy is equivalent to about 4% of the $6.199 retail diesel price (Snowshagal calculation). That is the tax amount as a share of the pump price—not a forecast price cut. This is deferral, not exemption (which Treasury was asked to consider separately), so actual savings and pass-through to consumers are uncertain. State rules on dyed diesel also vary²⁹
Limitations: The measures do not create new refining capacity (Tom Kloza, cited by CBS)²⁹ · They may change the usable fuel pool and when buyers pay

CHANNEL · Use restrictions + tax deferral

BANSEPT. 28 REVIEW · OCT. 02 SHELVED

Diesel export restrictions

What changes: Limits on overseas sales of U.S.-produced diesel. Reports said the idea was being considered on September 28,¹⁸ and Hana Securities interpreted it as leverage to press Europe to release reserves¹¹. On October 2, President Trump said the U.S. would not pursue an export ban¹⁹
Volume: U.S. distillate exports averaged 1.56m b/d over four weeks, equivalent to roughly 40% of domestic distillate product supplied (EIA; Snowshagal calculation)¹⁵ · A ban would not divert the entire volume to U.S. consumers
Before Nov. 3: The proposal is on hold. The G7 statement also discourages export restrictions among members²² · Revival of the proposal remains a separate risk
Limitations: If imposed, a ban could disrupt European and Latin American supply. In one Eugene Investment & Securities scenario, U.S. inventories rise, refinery utilization falls and lower gasoline output drives gasoline refining margins higher⁵

ON HOLD · Risk of revival

One measure lies outside the four cards. On October 10, the Department of Energy authorized an exchange of up to 4m barrels of crude from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve with ExxonMobil and BP to address Gulf of Mexico hurricane disruptions. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said the move was intended to maintain refinery operations and limit fuel-supply interruptions.³⁰ This would not add 4m barrels of diesel. Its role is to prevent crude feedstock shortages from shutting down refineries.

HOW MANY DAYSHow many days of U.S. demand could Russian diesel cover?

The Russian figures first need a common unit. Announcements are in tonnes, and Deputy Prime Minister Novak's October–December plan totals 1.8m tonnes, broadly matching the figures announced by President Trump.^{8, 12} Brokerage conversions differ. Eugene Investment & Securities calls 36m barrels “10 days of U.S. consumption”; Hana Securities puts 1.8m tonnes (13m–14m barrels) at “three to four days.”^{5, 11} Eugene's 36m-barrel figure is close to 4.8m tonnes—the three-month plan of 1.8m tonnes plus a further month at the later maximum of 3m tonnes. Neither firm specifies its demand denominator, so we recalculated using EIA's four-week average of distillate product supplied, a proxy for U.S. demand.

The October–December plan of 1.8m tonnes equals about 3.6 days of U.S. distillate demand

Russian government's Oct. 10 plan (Deputy PM Novak), expressed as days of U.S. distillate product supplied · Dashed line: one week of U.S. distillate exports

CALCULATION Tonnes × 7.5 barrels/tonne (the same conversion factor used by Eugene Investment & Securities) ÷ four-week average U.S. distillate product supplied (3.77m b/d, weeks ended Sept. 11–Oct. 2) · Announced plans as of Oct. 10, not contracted, loaded or landed volumes · U.S.-bound allocation unknown · Distillates include heating oil; EIA product supplied is used as a demand proxy · A 30-day distribution is illustrative · Snowshagal calculation

The October–December plan of 1.8m tonnes represents roughly 3.6 days of estimated U.S. distillate demand. Adding one month at the later 3m-tonne maximum raises the comparison to 9.6 days. This indicates scale, not a price effect. For illustration, spreading 13.5m barrels over 30 days gives 450,000 b/d—about 29% of U.S. distillate exports of 1.56m b/d (Snowshagal calculation). The actual impact depends on arrival rates, destinations and how much of the volume displaces existing supply. On October 12, Novak additionally projected that Russian monthly exports might recover to 3m–3.5m tonnes by year-end.²¹ That is a forecast of monthly export recovery, not contracted or shipped volumes. The chart therefore uses the October 10 plan.

days

SCALE COMPARISONRussian October–December plan, in days of U.S. distillate demand1.8m tonnes, or approx. 13.5m barrels · Including another month at the 3m-tonne maximum: 9.6 days · Plans, not shipments or arrivals

CALENDARHow the policy timetable lines up with Election Day

What can be verified before the election—and what comes afterward

Oct. 1–Nov. 14, 2026 · U.S. local dates · Dark cells mark major events; red marks Election Day

Sun

Mon

Tue

Wed

Thu

Fri

Sat

2026.10

2G7 deal

5Dyed-diesel EO

9GL135 · Hurricane

10Russia easing

11Energy truce claim

13Letter from 12 senators

14Sept. CPI 3.7%

15EIA stocks · PPI

22G7 diesel deadline

24EPA waiver ends

28FOMC

31Russia ban expires

2026.11 20 days to Election Day (as of Oct. 14)

3Midterms

10October CPI

10.02G7 agreement on reserve releases and refinery coordination · Trump: “No export ban”
10.05Dyed-diesel executive order signed · EPA Texas sulfur waiver (through Oct. 24)
10.09OFAC GL135 · Hurricane Isaias: peak Gulf production shut-ins
10.10Russia partly eases export ban (initial 500,000 tonnes) · DOE SPR crude exchange
10.11Trump claims an “energy truce” (not confirmed by Russia)
10.13Twelve senators ask to withdraw deal and GL135 · U.S. diesel futures rebound
10.14September CPI +3.7% YoY (3.6% expected) · Reflects prices before the policy measures
10.15EIA weekly inventories (holiday delay) · September PPI
10.22Approximate deadline for G7's first 20-day diesel-priority release
10.28FOMC decision · Oct. 29, 03:00 KST
10.31Russian diesel export-ban expiry (partly eased since Oct. 10)
11.03U.S. midterm elections
11.10October CPI · EIA short-term outlook

The calendar reveals the lag. Before Election Day, the main things to verify are the G7's initial diesel releases (around October 22) and whether Russia's October cargoes have been contracted and loaded. Russian November and later shipments would come after the vote. The first CPI release covering October's measures is due on November 10—after Election Day.³¹

04 · THE COUNTERCASE

The Case That Prices Have Peaked

Three-panel illustration of a Gulf of Mexico hurricane and oil platform, tankers in the narrow Strait of Hormuz, and a burning refinery under drone attack — Risks still in play before the election · Gulf of Mexico hurricane · Strait of Hormuz · Attacks on refineries · Illustration

There is a substantial case against assuming the squeeze lasts through Election Day. Pump prices have fallen for two consecutive weeks, and crack spreads initially eased following the announcements. Some policies also target refinery operations. The question is whether falling prices are accompanied by actual implementation and a recovery in output.

COUNTERARGUMENT 1 · Prices are already falling

EIA's weekly diesel price fell 5.1%, from $6.529 on September 21 to $6.199 on October 5. The decline from the peak was 3.8% using AAA's daily series (cited by Eugene Investment & Securities).^{3, 5} Weekly pump prices began falling in the week of September 28, before the G7 agreement (Oct. 2), dyed-diesel order (Oct. 5) and Russia measures (Oct. 9–10). On the day of the G7 announcement, Europe's diesel premium to crude briefly fell to $69/bbl, from $76.77 the previous day. The NYMEX crack spread fell $6.45 intraday on the Russian-diesel news.^{8, 26}

But weekly closing prices tell a different story by region. Converting European diesel from tonnes to barrels at 7.45 barrels/tonne, its premium over Brent rose from roughly $80 at the October 2 close to $94 at the October 9 close (Snowshagal calculation; not the same basis as the intraday quotation above).⁶ Asian gasoil spot prices fell 2.6% over the same week (Petronet data).⁵ With Russia's measures announced October 9–10, it is too early to judge them using those weekly closing prices. U.S. diesel futures also rebounded by about 5% on October 13.³² It is premature to say Russian supply authorization has stabilized product prices. The futures move is in the outright diesel price, however; it does not imply a comparable increase in the crack spread.

COUNTERARGUMENT 2 · Fourth-quarter cracks may narrow

Daishin Securities expects additional diesel supply to compress fourth-quarter gasoil crack spreads. From the perspective of Korean refiners, it anticipates better-than-expected Q3 results but contrasting inventory and crack-spread effects between Q3 and Q4.²⁷ EIA also expects crack spreads to ease but remain historically elevated, with retail diesel staying above $6/gal in October. Its baseline was prepared using information through October 1, before the G7 and Russian measures. EIA forecasts annual average diesel pump prices of $5.19/gal in 2026 and $4.49 in 2027.¹⁷

COUNTERARGUMENT 3 · Policy does reach the refining stage

The G7 statement goes beyond reserve releases: it calls for coordinating refinery maintenance and temporarily increasing utilization,²²while the DOE's SPR exchange aims to keep crude inputs flowing and refineries running.³⁰ Russia, meanwhile, partly lifted its diesel export ban on October 10.¹² It is not that refining has been ignored. The scale and timing of any additional production and cargo arrivals are simply unverified.

Hana Securities views the measures as stopgaps and expects replenishment demand to keep refining margins firm. Eugene Investment & Securities argues that high diesel-led margins will persist until war-damaged refining capacity is restored.^{5, 11} Retail prices have fallen, but product futures rebounded on October 13 and there is not yet a confirmed turn in inventories or capacity data.

OBSERVED · EIA WEEKLYRetail diesel over two weeks since Sept. 21 peak$6.529 → $6.199 · EIA weekly U.S. average · Still 67% above a year earlier

WILDCARDSFive variables still in play

Risks that could outweigh the announced measuresVerified developments through Oct. 13 (U.S. time) · Direction refers to diesel prices
Variable	What is known	Direction
Russia–Ukraine “energy truce”	Trump announced it on October 11. The Kremlin said only that “contacts are ongoing” on October 12, neither confirming nor denying the claim³³. Zelensky said Ukraine would reciprocate if Russia stopped³⁴. A White House official reportedly described it as a “refinery-for-refinery” arrangement (OilPrice, citing Axios)³⁵. Zelensky subsequently said Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure continued³⁵	Downside if implemented If upheld, it could materially improve supply. Repairing damaged facilities would still take months (Hana Securities previously cited up to six months for the Orsk refinery)¹¹
Iran / Hormuz	Trump said there would be “no strike on Iran before the election” on October 8. U.S.–Iran nuclear talks remain at odds^{5, 27}	Mixed The immediate tail risk before the vote has eased. iM Securities warns that a large-scale strike could occur afterward³⁶
Houthis / Red Sea	Riyadh international airport was attacked on October 10 (12 killed, 309 injured), with at least three incidents that week; reports on October 9 described mines being laid in the Bab el-Mandeb strait^{27, 37}	Upside risk
Hurricane Isaias	U.S. Gulf of Mexico oil-production shut-ins peaked at roughly 71.5% on October 9 (Eugene Investment & Securities: 72%, or 1.46m b/d); by October 13 the share was down to about 16% as production resumed (U.S. agency data)^{5, 38, 39}. About 500,000 b/d of refining capacity was in the hurricane's path; that is exposure, not confirmed offline capacity (Energy Aspects estimate)⁴⁰	Upside risk Recovery is under way · Check remaining shut-ins and refinery restarts
China's export approvals	About 3.7m tonnes re-authorized for October on Oct. 9 (diesel, gasoline and jet fuel combined); monthly approvals give officials tighter control^{11, 13}	Mixed November's authorized volumes are the next test

KNOWN · ESTIMATE · UNKNOWNKnown, estimated and still unknown

KNOWNCONFIRMED FACTS

September wholesale diesel +107.4% YoY; WTI crude +52.1% (EIA monthly averages)
OFAC GL135 (Oct. 9); partial Russian export-ban easing and initial 500,000 tonnes (Oct. 10)
G7 agreement to release up to 100m barrels and coordinate refinery operations (Oct. 2)
Trump: “We won't impose an export ban” (Oct. 2)
September CPI +3.7% YoY (3.6% expected), core +2.6% (BLS, Oct. 14)
October CPI to be released Nov. 10, after Election Day

ESTIMATEPUBLISHED INSTITUTIONAL ESTIMATES

Days of U.S. consumption represented by Russian supplies: Eugene Investment & Securities 10 days; Hana Securities 3–4 days; Snowshagal 3.6 days (Oct.–Dec. plan against EIA distillate product supplied)
Q4 crack direction: Daishin expects a decline; Hana and Eugene expect continued strength
EIA: October retail diesel above $6/gal (Oct. 1 information cutoff; excludes G7/Russia measures)
Seasonal diesel margin pattern: Hana Securities' 2011–25 average, excluding 2022–23

UNKNOWNSTILL UNKNOWN

Actual Russian contracts, loadings and arrivals; U.S.-bound allocation; consequences of congressional objections
Russian confirmation and implementation of the alleged “energy truce”
How much of the G7 releases is new, and how much additional refinery production coordination creates
Whether a U.S. export ban will resurface
How quickly Gulf of Mexico refineries restart

Illustration of a red truck hauling a cutaway freight trailer loaded with boxes, apples, milk, lettuce and bread, with exhaust smoke behind it — Diesel reaches the shopping basket through freight costs · Illustration

05 · INFLATION

Gasoline in CPI,
Diesel in the Supply Chain

Diesel's direct weight in U.S. consumer inflation is far smaller than gasoline's. The bigger route into prices runs through freight costs. September CPI, released October 14, showed inflation pressures that predated the policy announcements; any effect of the October measures must be assessed from subsequent product prices and inventories.

DIRECT WEIGHTA small direct weight

In the August CPI detailed tables, gasoline represented 3.770% of the index on a July 2026 relative-importance basis. Motor diesel falls under “other motor fuels” (0.112%), while heating oil appears under “fuel oil” (0.107%).^{41, 42} “Other motor fuels” is broader than diesel: it also covers ethanol blends, biodiesel, natural gas and electricity for vehicles. The two CPI categories together carried 0.219%—about one-seventeenth of gasoline's weight. Because relative importance shifts with prices, their combined weight increased from 0.169% in December 2025 (when gasoline was 2.895%).⁴³

Direct fuel-category weights and inflation ratesU.S. CPI relative importance (July 2026) and August YoY change
Category	Relative weight	August YoY	Classification
Gasoline	3.770%	+27.4%	Direct fuel
Other motor fuels Includes diesel	0.112%	+44.0%	Direct fuel
Fuel oil (heating oil) Middle distillate	0.107%	+52.0%	Direct fuel
Reference · All energy	7.347%	+16.3%	·
Reference · Food	13.540%	+2.7%	Indirectly affected by freight

Relative weights change as prices change · Source: BLS August CPI detailed table (July 2026 relative weights), December 2025 relative weights · The September CPI detailed table released Oct. 14 lists August weights of 3.853% for gasoline, 0.123% for other motor fuels and 0.115% for fuel oil (combined: 0.238%)⁴⁴

OBSERVED · BLS JULY 2026Direct CPI weight of categories that include dieselOther motor fuels 0.112% + fuel oil 0.107% · Gasoline 3.770% · Combined weight in December 2025: 0.169%

INDIRECTThe indirect route: freight and airfares

In August's Producer Price Index, diesel rose 24.1% month on month; truck transportation rose 2.0%, and transportation and warehousing services 2.3%.⁴⁵ Higher freight rates may feed through to food and goods prices with a lag. September PPI is due October 15.⁴⁶

Airfares are another services category exposed to fuel costs. Jet fuel comes from the same middle-distillate family as diesel. CPI airfares rose 23.4% year on year in August.⁴⁷ But demand and seat capacity also affect fares, so the full increase cannot be attributed to fuel.

OCT 14 · 21:30 KSTOctober 14: Expectations versus the release

Daishin Securities' Bloomberg consensus figures called for September headline CPI of 3.6% YoY and core CPI of 2.5%, up from August's 3.4% and 2.4%. The firm cited September diesel prices as part of the pressure (EIA average retail diesel: $6.29/gal).^{17, 46} Month-on-month expectations were 0.6% for headline and 0.2% for core (as compiled by FinancialJuice; survey provider unspecified).⁴⁸

The actual September headline reading was 3.7% YoY, 0.1 percentage point above consensus. Monthly inflation was 0.6%, in line with expectations. Gasoline did most of the work on headline inflation. Gasoline rose 9.1% during the month, accounting for more than half of the overall monthly gain, and was up 34.2% YoY. Other motor fuels (which include diesel) rose 60.9% YoY and fuel oil 74.2%, versus 44.0% and 52.0% in August. Their smaller weights meant less impact on the headline number than gasoline.⁴⁴

Core CPI also beat expectations, rising 2.6% YoY and 0.3% month on month—each 0.1 percentage point above consensus. Shelter costs rose 0.4% on the month, and airfares also increased.⁴⁴ With core inflation above expectations as well, this was not solely an energy-price story. The release does not, however, isolate how much diesel-driven freight costs contributed to core CPI.

September CPI is not a report card on October's measures. Its 3.7% YoY reading comes from September prices, before the policies announced from October 2 onward. That is separate from its political significance as the last CPI release before the midterms.

September CPI scorecardReleased Oct. 14, 2026, 8:30 a.m. ET / 9:30 p.m. KST · Actual data: BLS
Measure	August	September consensus	September actual
Headline YoY	3.4%	3.6%	3.7%
Core YoY	2.4%	2.5%	2.6%
Headline MoM	0.4%	0.6%	0.6%
Core MoM	0.3%	0.2%	0.3%
Gasoline YoY	+27.4%	·	+34.2%
Other motor fuels YoY	+44.0%	·	+60.9%
Fuel oil YoY	+52.0%	·	+74.2%
Airfares YoY	+23.4%	·	+22.4%

Consensus: YoY estimates from Daishin Securities (Bloomberg, Oct. 11); MoM estimates from FinancialJuice (survey provider unspecified) · August/September actuals from BLS (YoY unadjusted; MoM seasonally adjusted)

Ahead of the release, Daishin Securities argued that with the upper policy-rate bound at 4.0%, above inflation, any CPI shock might be temporary. Kiwoom Securities said markets continued to price another December rate increase.^{46, 49} This report does not include the post-release rates or market reaction. The October FOMC decision is scheduled for October 29 at 03:00 KST.

06 · KOREA

The Diesel Story, Seen from Ulsan

Illustration of a petroleum-products tanker leaving a refinery port at sunset, with its dotted route extending toward the horizon — From Ulsan to Europe · About 670,000 barrels of Korean diesel were being exported to Europe in September (roughly 20,000 km, a four-to-five-week journey; Hana Securities, Sept. 7) · Illustration

The U.S. diesel squeeze reaches Korean markets through three channels. For refiners, it is the gap between realized product sales prices and crude acquisition costs. For airlines, it is the cost of jet fuel translated into won. For interest rates, the path runs through U.S. inflation. A lower crack spread does not automatically hurt refiners and help airlines.

EXPORTSExport growth driven by prices, not volume

According to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources' September trade report, Korea exported $7.22bn of petroleum products, up 72.0% year on year. Volumes fell 6.9% to 5.7m tonnes, while the unit price jumped 84.7% to $1,267/tonne. Dubai crude averaged $113.71/bbl that month, up 62.4%.^{50, 51} This was a price-led increase, not a volume boom: Korea shipped similar or smaller quantities at far higher unit values. Exports to the EU rose 241.8% during September 1–25. Media reports linked this to local jet-fuel inventory shortages, but that was not an official explanation from the ministry.⁵¹ Higher export prices do not translate directly into refiner profits. Crude acquisition costs, freight and operating expenses also matter.

OBSERVED · KOREAN TRADE MINISTRYSeptember petroleum-product export unit prices, YoY$1,267/tonne · Export value $7.22bn (+72.0%) · Volume 5.7m tonnes (−6.9%) · Dubai crude +62.4% in the same month

REFINING

Pricing power of an exporting refiner

37.1USD/bbl

Asian complex refining margin, week of Oct. 9 (Hana Securities).¹¹

Korea has the world's fifth-largest refining capacity. Hana Securities argues Korea's importance is growing as the U.S., China and Russia treat diesel more like a strategic asset, describing Korea as a “swing producer.” Domestic utilization and spare production capacity still need verification
Saudi Arab Light's November official selling price (OSP) to Asia was set at a $5/bbl discount to Oman/Dubai, down $3 from October⁵². Hana Securities estimates the September–November average OSP (−$3) is $11 below the June–August average (+$8), potentially easing Q4 crude costs, subject to procurement and accounting lags
Daishin Securities expects Q3 refining results to beat estimates but warns of narrower gasoil crack spreads in Q4²⁷

AIRLINES

Jet fuel costs in won

42.0%

Fuel as a share of Korean Air's standalone Q2 operating expenses. A typical airline share is around 30% (Hanwha Investment & Securities).⁵³

Fuel bills depend on jet-fuel purchase prices, consumption, exchange rates and hedging. Fuel surcharges are a separate variable showing how much of the increase airlines can recover in revenue. A narrower crack spread alone does not guarantee lower fuel costs
Asian kerosene spot prices, for a distillate in the same family as jet fuel, stood at $174.9/bbl on October 9—above gasoil (Eugene Investment & Securities)⁵
Eugene Investment & Securities estimates the November international fuel surcharge at level 27, based on October 11 jet-fuel prices (not yet confirmed)⁵⁴ · USD/KRW (KRW 1,335.5 per dollar on Oct. 12) also determines the local-currency burden of dollar-priced fuel⁴⁹

RATES

From CPI to the FOMC

5.24%

U.S. 10-year Treasury yield, Oct. 9 close (Kiwoom Securities; U.S. bond market closed Oct. 12).⁴⁹

iM Securities sees oil prices as the main variable for Treasury-yield stabilization, with a widening Saudi–Houthi conflict the immediate risk³⁶
Sequence: September CPI (Oct. 14) → FOMC (Oct. 29, 03:00 KST) → Election Day (Nov. 3)
September headline CPI was 3.7% and core 2.6%, both 0.1 percentage point above expectations⁴⁴ · The FOMC will clarify how policymakers assess the rates path

WHAT TO WATCHThe indicators that matter by sector

The crack spread measures a product's premium over crude, not its outright price. If crude rises faster, the spread can narrow even while refined-product prices remain flat or rise.

A narrowing spread does not always mean a cheaper productIllustrative assumption, not a forecast · USD/bbl
Measure	Before	After
Crude price	100	120
Product–crude spread (crack)	100	80
Product price	200	200

One bottleneck, different indicators by sectorDirectional framework · Does not test whether share prices already reflect these factors · Not an investment recommendation
Sector	What determines earnings	What to monitor	What the crack spread alone misses
Refining	Product selling price − crude acquisition cost − freight and operating costs	Asian complex refining margin; petroleum export unit prices and volumes; OSP	The New York Harbor crack is a regional benchmark, not realized margin
Airlines	Fuel costs (jet-fuel price, consumption, FX and hedges), offset by fuel surcharges in revenue	Asian jet-fuel/kerosene spot prices; USD/KRW; fuel-surcharge tiers	Fuel may get dearer as crude rises even if the crack narrows
U.S. inflation / rates	Product and service prices actually passed on to consumers	CPI gasoline, other motor fuels, fuel oil and airfares; PPI diesel and trucking	Diesel's direct CPI weight is small; freight pass-through takes time

END · WHAT TO WATCH

Six Gauges to Watch Before the Vote

The proof of policy impact lies less in announced volumes than in shipments, inventories and like-for-like product prices. Watch whether these six readings begin pointing in the same direction. Each comparison must use the same data series and time basis.

EIA WEEKLY · MONDAY BASIS

National average retail diesel

A weekly reading below $6/gal would confirm further relief at the pump. Compare EIA's October forecast (information through Oct. 1, before the measures) against the October monthly average, not a single weekly reading

USD/gal · Week of Oct. 5

NEXT · Week of Oct. 12, published Oct. 14 (U.S. time)

EIA SPOT · MONTHLY AVERAGE

Diesel crack (New York Harbor ULSD minus WTI)

September 2025: $36.4; October 2022: $94.9. Compare October's monthly average with the same series once it is available. Before the election, NYMEX daily cracks can indicate direction only; they are not directly comparable in level

USD/bbl · September average

NEXT · October monthly average (EIA, early November)

EIA WEEKLY · WEDNESDAY

U.S. distillate inventories

Around 12% below the five-year average for the same week ended Sept. 18 (EPA citation). Latest stocks: 105.14m barrels in the week of Oct. 2. East Coast (PADD 1) stocks were 32% below September's seasonal norm (EIA)

Million barrels · Week of Sept. 18

NEXT · Oct. 15 (holiday delay)

BLS · 10/14 · 10/15

September CPI and PPI

Measures of price pressure before the interventions. September CPI was 3.7%, above 3.6% expected, with core at 2.6%. On a YoY basis: gasoline +34.2%, other motor fuels +60.9%, fuel oil +74.2%. For PPI, watch diesel and trucking

% · September CPI YoY

NEXT · September PPI Oct. 15 · October CPI Nov. 10

G7 · IEA

Priority diesel releases and refinery coordination

How much of the release is additional supply, and whether refinery utilization responds. Europe's diesel premium rose from about $80 at the Oct. 2 close to about $94 on Oct. 9 (Snowshagal calculation)

Around the 20-day deadline

IEA member-country release status

RUSSIA · PERMITTED OCT. 10

Contracts, shipments and arrivals under the export allowance

Whether the planned 300,000 October tonnes were loaded, where they are headed, how much will reach the U.S., and whether Russia confirms the “energy truce”

10,000 tonnes · Initial authorized volume

Export-ban expiry · Oct. 31

How to read the gauges

If only pump prices fallFalling retail diesel with an unchanged crack spread and inventory shortfall may mostly reflect lower crude prices. That is not enough to establish relief in the product bottleneck
Signs that the bottleneck is easingOn a consistent basis, the New York Harbor monthly spot crack falls from September's $110.8, while inventories close their gap to the five-year average for the same week · The post-war March–August average crack of $73.9 is context, not a threshold
The biggest supply-side swing factorActual Russian diesel shipments under the authorization and confirmation of an “energy truce” by Moscow. Repairs to damaged refinery capacity could still take months

An assessment of U.S. diesel supply and policy channels ahead of the midterms · Not investment advice · Reference dates and calculation methods are documented below

GLOSSARY

Crack spreadThe difference between the price of a refined product and a crude benchmark. Here: New York Harbor ULSD spot price × 42 − WTI spot price. EIA treats crack spreads as a short-term indicator of refinery profitability, but they exclude other variable and fixed costs.

Middle distillatesThe middle cuts of crude distillation, including diesel, heating oil and kerosene/jet fuel.

DistillatesAn EIA statistical grouping encompassing diesel and heating oil, used to report inventories, consumption proxies and exports.

ULSDUltra-low-sulfur diesel with a sulfur content no higher than 15 ppm; the standard specification for U.S. on-road diesel.

Dyed dieselTax-exempt diesel for off-road applications, such as farm and construction equipment; dyed red to distinguish it.

Product suppliedEIA's proxy for consumption, calculated as production + imports − exports − increase in inventories.

Complex refining marginA refining margin based on the mix of products produced by a refinery. Hana Securities cites an Asian benchmark.

OSPThe premium or discount to a crude reference price set monthly by producers such as Saudi Aramco for sales into each region.

PADDThe five petroleum-statistics regions in the U.S. PADD 1 covers the East Coast.

General License(GL)A general license from the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) temporarily permitting otherwise sanctioned transactions.

SPR exchangeA transaction in which crude from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is lent to a company and later returned with additional barrels. This is not an outright sale.

Relative importanceA category's share of the CPI basket. BLS publishes a December reference weight and reports the prior month's relative weights in each detailed CPI table. A category's share can rise as its price increases.

Seasonal refinery maintenanceScheduled refinery shutdowns for inspections and servicing, typically concentrated in spring and autumn in the U.S.

SOURCES · DATES · METHODOLOGY

DATA CUTOFF October 14, 2026, 10:00 p.m. KST · Includes September U.S. CPI, released at 9:30 p.m. KST on October 14

Type	Details
Reference date	EIA weekly retail prices: week of Oct. 5 (released Oct. 6); EIA monthly spot prices through September; EIA weekly supply/demand estimates: week of Oct. 2; BLS September CPI (released Oct. 14), August PPI, CPI relative weights for July 2026 (in August's detailed CPI report; August weights from September's report are also shown below the table in Chapter 05); Korean trade ministry's September trade report (Oct. 1); brokerage figures as of each publication (Oct. 12–13)
Snowshagal calculations	Crack = New York Harbor ULSD spot × 42 − WTI spot (monthly averages) · Diesel price-change breakdown splits the identity “diesel = WTI + spread”; it is not a causal attribution or refiners' earnings · September retail mean = simple average of weekly readings · Russian-supply comparison = tonnes × 7.5 barrels/tonne ÷ four-week average distillate product supplied (weeks of Sept. 11–Oct. 2: 3.769m b/d) · Illustrative 30-day pace = 13.5m barrels ÷ 30 days = 450,000 b/d, about 29% of average distillate exports (1.560m b/d over four weeks) · Federal diesel excise-tax share = 24.4 cents ÷ $6.199 (a tax amount, not an estimated pump-price reduction) · European diesel premium = ICE ARA diesel ($/tonne) ÷ 7.45 − Brent, backed out from Hanwha Investment & Securities' Table 3 October 9 close and weekly changes (approx. $80 on Oct. 2 → $94 on Oct. 9); this differs from the Bloomberg fair-value intraday figures ($76.77 → $69) · Post-war crack average of $73.9 = simple average of monthly cracks from March–August 2026
Differences in data basis	The NYMEX front-month crack ($96.80 intraday Oct. 9 per S&P Global) differs from Snowshagal's monthly New York Harbor spot crack · Diesel's decline from peak varies between EIA weekly (−5.1%) and AAA daily (−3.8%, cited by Eugene Investment & Securities) · Gulf of Mexico production shut-ins depend on the observation time: around 63% on Oct. 8, 71.5% at the Oct. 9 peak (same period as Eugene's 72%/1.46m b/d estimate), and about 16% on Oct. 13 · CPI relative weights differ for July 2026 (combined diesel-inclusive fuel categories 0.219%), August 2026 (0.238%, September detailed report) and December 2025 (0.169%) · China's October figure of 3.7m tonnes is the combined approved export quota for three fuels; Hana's comparison of “20% below August” appears to use August customs export volume (4.58m tonnes, cited by S&P Global), with no stated August benchmark
Estimates, not company disclosures	Brokerage projections of crack-spread direction, OSP cost effects and fuel-surcharge tiers are analysts' estimates · Russian figures are government plans (Deputy PM Novak, Oct. 10) and Trump's announced amounts, not contracted or loaded cargoes · Novak's Oct. 12 statement of “3m–3.5m tonnes a month by year-end” is a recovery forecast for monthly exports · EIA's short-term forecast used information through Oct. 1, excluding later G7/Russian measures · September CPI forecasts are Bloomberg estimates compiled by Daishin and figures reported by FinancialJuice

EIA · Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB (monthly), through September 2026 · eia.gov
EIA · New York Harbor Ultra-Low Sulfur No 2 Diesel Spot Price (monthly), through September 2026 · eia.gov
EIA · U.S. No 2 Diesel Retail Prices (weekly, tax included), through week of October 5, 2026 · eia.gov
EIA · U.S. Regular Gasoline Retail Prices (weekly), through week of October 5, 2026 · eia.gov
Eugene Investment & Securities · “Weekly Energy: After Russia Sanctions Relief, What Comes Next?” · Oct. 13, 2026 · p. 1 analysis; p. 2, Exhibit 1 (Oct. 9 product prices, Petronet/Bloomberg); AAA comparisons of diesel +71% and crude +56%; Russian supply of 36m barrels characterized as “10 days of U.S. consumption” (conversion not specified); export-ban scenario
Hanwha Investment & Securities · “Transition Weekly” · Oct. 13, 2026 · p. 5, Table 3 (key commodity prices at Oct. 9 close, Bloomberg)
EIA · “3:2:1 Crack Spread” (Today in Energy explainer): crack spreads indicate short-term refinery profitability but exclude other variable and fixed costs · eia.gov
S&P Global Commodity Insights · “NYMEX ULSD crack weakens after Trump announces additional diesel supplies from Russia” · Oct. 9, 2026 · The $96.80 crack was an intraday reading at 19:33 GMT · Also cites S&P Global Energy CERA (Sept. 30) on Russia's refining capacity, Q3 diesel shipments and export ban · spglobal.com
EIA · Gasoline and Diesel Fuel Update, week of Oct. 5, 2026 · Next release Oct. 14 · eia.gov
S&P Global Commodity Insights · “Middle East diesel exports to Europe head for six-year low in September” · Sept. 21, 2026 · Commodities at Sea estimates (September through the 21st) · spglobal.com
Hana Securities · “Energy/Chemicals Weekly Monitor: U.S. Even Allows Imports of Russian Diesel” · Oct. 12, 2026 · p. 1 (Russian 1.8m-tonne plan / three-to-four-day comparison, China October export approvals, $37.1 refining margin, OSP/Q4 crude costs); p. 8 (Oct. 6 excerpt on diesel's strategic role and Korea's fifth-largest refining capacity); p. 12 (Sept. 7 excerpt on 900,000 b/d Hormuz diesel flow, 98% utilization, middle-distillate inventories and Korean diesel shipments to Europe); pp. 14–15 (Aug. 18 excerpt, Chart 37 on Asian seasonal diesel margins; up to six months for Orsk refinery repairs)
TASS · Russia's partial easing of its diesel export ban (effective Oct. 10; initial 500,000 tonnes) and Deputy PM Novak's monthly plan (300,000 tonnes October; 500,000 November; 1m December; up to 3m/month later) · Oct. 10, 2026 · tass.com
OilPrice.com (citing Reuters) · “China Restarts Fuel Exports” · Oct. 9, 2026 · Authorized October exports total 3.7m tonnes of gasoline, diesel and jet fuel · oilprice.com
S&P Global Commodity Insights · “China resumes clean oil product exports after holiday halt; Oct volumes seen lower on month” · Oct. 9, 2026 · Analyst estimate of at least 3.5m tonnes for October (jet fuel about 2.1m; gasoil 0.9m; gasoline 0.5m); August customs exports 4.58m tonnes · spglobal.com
EIA · Weekly Supply Estimates (distillate inventories, utilization, product supplied and exports), weeks ended Aug. 28–Oct. 2, 2026 · eia.gov
U.S. EPA · Emergency Texas fuel-specification waiver letter to the governor, Administrator Lee Zeldin · Oct. 5, 2026 · Oct. 5–24 exemption permitting 500-ppm-sulfur diesel; cites September 18 refinery utilization of 94% and distillate inventories about 12% below the five-year average · epa.gov(PDF)
EIA · Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026 · Oct. 6, 2026 · Prepared with information through Oct. 1, so excludes Oct. 2 G7 measures; September retail diesel average $6.29, October expected above $6, 2026 annual average $5.19 and 2027 $4.49; East Coast (PADD 1) inventories · eia.gov
CNBC · “Trump seriously considering U.S. diesel export ban amid supply crunch” (as titled) · Sept. 28, 2026 · cnbc.com
Bloomberg (republished by Yahoo Finance) · Trump's White House statement, “we're not going to be doing the export ban” · Oct. 2, 2026 · finance.yahoo.com
U.S. Treasury OFAC · Recent Actions "Issuance of Russia-related General License"(GL 135) · 2026.10.09 · ofac.treasury.gov
TASS · “Russia could reach diesel export volumes of 3–3.5 mln tons per month in 2026 – Novak” · Oct. 12, 2026 · Novak projected monthly world-market supply of up to 3.5m tonnes by year-end, about the pre-crisis level · tass.com
G7 leaders' statement on energy security and market stability (posted by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) · Oct. 2, 2026 · Up to 100m barrels via the IEA over four months, with diesel prioritized in the first 20 days; coordination of refinery maintenance, temporary utilization increases, cooperation with major refiners and restraint on energy export restrictions within the G7 · mofa.go.jp(PDF)
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Democratic ranking member's office) · “Ranking Member Shaheen and 6 Bipartisan Senators' Statement on Legality of Imports of Russian Diesel Fuel” · Oct. 11, 2026 · Shaheen, Blumenthal and Wyden (D); Collins, Murkowski, Tillis and Curtis (R) · Cites 2022 ban on Russian energy imports and calls for immediate withdrawal · foreign.senate.gov
Office of U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal · “Bipartisan Senators Call on Trump to Rescind Russian Diesel Deal & Implement Sanctions Authorized by Congress Last Month on Enablers of Putin's War Against Ukraine” · Oct. 13, 2026 · Twelve signatories: Blumenthal, Shaheen, Durbin, Whitehouse, Reed and Coons (D); Tillis, Collins, Armstrong, Murkowski, McConnell and Cornyn (R) · Requests withdrawal of the Oct. 9 deal and OFAC GL135, and implementation of the “Russia and Iran Sanctions Act of 2026” · Five overlapped with Oct. 11's statement (Blumenthal, Shaheen, Tillis, Collins, Murkowski) · blumenthal.senate.gov
Axios · “House Republican, invoking Reagan, moves to block Trump's Russia oil deal” · Oct. 10, 2026 · Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick proposed legislation and a discharge petition; the House vote timetable would fall after the election · axios.com
Bloomberg (republished by Energy Connects) · “G7 to Release Up to 100 Million Barrels of Diesel, Crude” · Oct. 2, 2026 · Diesel releases within 20 days; diplomatic assessment that only part of the volume is new; European diesel premium $76.77 → $69 intraday; reaffirmation of restraint on export restrictions · energyconnects.com
Daishin Securities · “A Week That Passed Korea By. Is Korea Next? CPI Will Set the Rates, TSMC the AI Tone” (weekly market outlook, 238 pp.) · Oct. 12, 2026 · p. 18 oil-event table (G7 diesel priority within 20 days, JPM's earlier commitments, dyed diesel, Trump's Oct. 8 no-pre-election-Iran-strike remarks, Oct. 9 Bab el-Mandeb mine reports); p. 64 (Q3 refining earnings beat, Q4 diesel-crack decline)
The White House · Executive Order 14435, “Emergency Tax Relief on Diesel Fuel,” signed Oct. 5, 2026 · Section 2: Treasury to assess eligibility and feasibility of diesel excise-tax deferral under 26 U.S.C. 7508A through Dec. 31; IRS non-enforcement of penalties for road use of dyed diesel; Section 3 implementing guidance; Section 4 review of exemption options · whitehouse.gov
CBS News (via News9) · “Trump temporarily expands access to tax-free red-dyed diesel. Will it lower costs?” · Oct. 6, 2026 · 24.4-cent federal excise tax deferral, differences in state rules and remarks by Tom Kloza and Patrick De Haan · news9.com
U.S. Department of Energy · “Energy Department Authorizes Strategic Petroleum Reserve Exchange to Address Supply Disruptions Due to Hurricane” · Oct. 10, 2026 · Up to 4m barrels of crude (up to 2m each for ExxonMobil and BP); comments by Secretary Chris Wright · energy.gov
BLS · CPI release schedule · October CPI: Nov. 10, 2026, at 08:30 ET · bls.gov
investingLive · “Catch up time! Oil settles mixed, Brent near $106; booms reported near Aramco HQ in Dhahran” · Oct. 13, 2026 · U.S. diesel futures rose around 5% by late trading; Brent closed near $106 and WTI near $94 · Reports varied between about 4.5% and 5%, hence “around 5%” · investinglive.com
The Kyiv Independent · “Kremlin has nothing to say on Trump's energy ceasefire, rejects Zelensky's truce proposal” · Oct. 12, 2026 · Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said contacts were under way and Moscow would speak when it had something to report · kyivindependent.com
Axios · "Trump says Russia and Ukraine agreed to immediate energy ceasefire" · 2026.10.11 · axios.com
OilPrice.com · “Trump's Russia-Ukraine Energy Ceasefire May Only Cover Oil Refineries” (citing an Axios report of White House comments) · Oct. 11, 2026 · oilprice.com
iM Securities · “Economy Brief: Can Treasury Yields Stabilize?” · Oct. 12, 2026 · p. 2
DS Investment & Securities · “DS Weekly Defense: The End of the Russia–Ukraine and Middle East Wars Looks Increasingly Elusive” · Oct. 12, 2026 · p. 1 (Riyadh airport attack); p. 2, Table 1 (terms of Russian-diesel agreement)
BOE Report(Reuters) · "About 71.5% of US Gulf oil production shut in ahead of Hurricane Isaias" · 2026.10.09 · boereport.com
A News (Anadolu) · “More than 16% of US Gulf oil production shut in response to Isaias” · Oct. 13, 2026 · U.S. Maritime Minerals Administration (MMA) tally at 11:00 a.m. CT: 16.13% · anews.com.tr
Offshore Engineering Digital(Reuters) · "US Gulf Oil Production Cut by 63% as Hurricane Nears" · 2026.10.09 · oedigital.com
BLS · CPI Detailed Report, Table 2, August 2026 · Sept. 11, 2026 · July 2026 relative weights: gasoline 3.770, other motor fuels 0.112, fuel oil 0.107, energy 7.347, food 13.540; other motor fuels +44.0% YoY · Archived August release · bls.gov
BLS · CPI Fact Sheet, “Motor fuel” (other motor fuels includes motor diesel, ethanol blends, biodiesel, natural gas and electricity for vehicles) · bls.gov
BLS · Relative Importance of Components in the CPI, December 2025 · bls.gov
BLS · Consumer Price Index News Release, September 2026 (2026 M09 Results) · Oct. 14, 2026 · +3.7% headline and +2.6% core YoY (not seasonally adjusted), +0.6% headline and +0.3% core MoM (seasonally adjusted) · Gasoline +9.1% MoM, accounting for more than half of the monthly increase · YoY: gasoline +34.2%, other motor fuels +60.9%, fuel oil +74.2%, airfares +22.4%, energy +20.4% · Shelter +0.4% MoM · Table 2 August 2026 relative weights: gasoline 3.853, other motor fuels 0.123, fuel oil 0.115 · bls.gov
BLS · Producer Price Index, August 2026 · Sept. 10, 2026 · Diesel +24.1%, truck freight +2.0%, final-demand transportation and warehousing services +2.3% MoM · Archived August release · bls.gov
Daishin Securities · “THE GLOBAL: Weekly Equity Strategy, Third Week of October” · Oct. 12, 2026 (cover date of Sept. 18 is an error in source report) · p. 1 and Table 1: September CPI forecasts of 3.6% headline, 2.5% core (Bloomberg as of Oct. 11); upper policy-rate bound 4.0%; September PPI due Oct. 15
BLS · Consumer Price Index, August 2026 · Sept. 11, 2026 · Airfares +23.4% YoY, among other figures · Archived August release · bls.gov
FinancialJuice · “US CPI Prep (14th October)” · Oct. 12, 2026 · September MoM consensus +0.6% headline, +0.2% core (survey provider unspecified) · financialjuice.com
Kiwoom Securities · “KIWOOM FICC DAILY: Dollar Rises amid Inflation Concerns” · Oct. 13, 2026 · p. 1: WTI $93.74, USD/KRW 1,335.5, U.S. 10-year yield 5.238%, expectations of another December rate hike
Korean Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources · “September 2026 Import and Export Trends” · Oct. 1, 2026 · Petroleum exports $7.22bn (+72.0%), unit price $1,267/tonne (+84.7%), volume −6.9% · Original is an attached PDF hosted by the KDI Economic Information Center; product figures cross-checked against the Newsis report· eiec.kdi.re.kr
e2news · Report on the ministry's “September 2026 Import and Export Trends” (released Oct. 1) · Petroleum exports $7.22bn (+72.0%); 5.7m tonnes (−6.9%); unit prices +84.7%; Dubai crude $113.71 (+62.4%); EU-bound exports +241.8% (Sept. 1–25) · e2news.com
investingLive · “Saudi Aramco cuts Arab Light price to Asia by $3, widest discount since 2020” · Oct. 4, 2026 · November Arab Light OSP to Asia: $5/bbl discount to Oman/Dubai · investinglive.com
Hanwha Investment & Securities · “Airlines: Finally, a Favorable Cycle” (88 pp.) · Oct. 12, 2026 · pp. 60–61 (fuel costs; Korean Air standalone Q2 2026: 42.0% of operating expenses)
Eugene Investment & Securities · “Air Transport: September Aviation Data, a Record Q3” · Oct. 12, 2026 · pp. 1, 5 (November fuel-surcharge estimate based on Oct. 11 jet-fuel prices)